The Great Depression hit both Australia and the United States hard. Real Gross Domestic Product experienced drastic drops. Unemployment rates rose well above ten percent to levels that are multiples of rates seen since. Australia began recovering one to two years earlier and the situation never reached the depths experienced in America. Both countries began their turnarounds after explicitly or implicitly eliminating their ties to the gold standard. Neither appears to have followed a full-scale Keynesian policy to combat the Depression by increasing national government deficits by amounts anywhere near the size of the problem.
The various governments in both countries embarked on large-scale efforts to aid the unemployed and the poor during the Depression using work relief projects. The economy in Australia turned around earlier than in America and the Commonwealth government in Australia never provide more than a small share of funding. In contrast, the federal government in America financed a large segment of the relief effort after 1932. My goal in this paper is to compare and contrast the relief efforts in the U.S. and Australia during the 1930s, discuss the effectiveness of relief spending in America based on a series of studies in which I participated, and then provide some new results for the impact of relief spending on various demographic measures in the Australian States between 1929 and 1939.
It has been an honor to have the opportunity to give the Butlin Lecture. Noel Butlin was a great economic historian who compiled and constructed a large share of the data that are used to describe the history of the Australian economy. In a sign of true genius, he even produced sons who have carried on the tradition. Professor Butlin and Robert Gregory also edited a comprehensive volume on the Recovery from the Depression in Australia and the rest of the world. In preparing the lecture and writing the paper, I have learned an enormous amount from his writings and the statistics that he developed.
The Size of the Problem
The Depression in the U.S. was much deeper and lasted longer than in Australia. The index of U.S. Real GDP in Figure 1 The figure shows two U.S. unemployment rates, one including federal emergency relief workers and one without them. Michael Darby (1976) raised the question of whether federal emergency relief workers should be treated as unemployed. Work relief was designed as a most people agree on the nominal estimates of Australian GDP for the 1920s and 1930s. Noel Butlin estimated a GDP deflator but was dissatisfied with it. Mathew Butlin developed a second set of estimates of the deflator, but he too was dissatisfied. Bryan Haig (2001) developed an alternative estimate of real GDP by constructing it from the ground up with a fixed set of 1938-1939 prices for goods. program to provide funds to families to raise their earnings high enough to meet minimum spending standards. As a result, relief workers for the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) from 1933 through 1935 and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) from 1935 through 1942 received hourly wages that were roughly half of the hourly wages paid to men working on federal public works and public roads projects that operated under normal federal procedures. Further, relief workers faced constraints on the number of hours they could work per month. Essentially, relief work paid wages that were roughly as generous as a share of regular wages as modern unemployment benefits while adding a work requirement. My own view is that they should be treated as unemployed to be comparable with modern unemployment figures.
The Australian unemployment rates listed in Figure 2 were developed by Keating (1973) who developed two estimates based on Census information from 1929, 1933 , and 1939 while using trade union unemployment figures to interpolate in between. The higher estimates include adjustments Keating made while arguing that the trade union figures understated union unemployment in some years. Forster (1988, 291, 296) suggests that the treatment of Australian relief workers was inconsistent in the Census benchmarks. In 1939 the Australian figures include relief workers among the unemployed in 1939 because the Census asked relief workers to describe themselves as unemployed. The Census of 1933 had no such statement and the Census Statistician thought that a number of people who had reported themselves to be working part-time on sustenance or relief work should have been added to the unemployed. Information from Forster (p. 296) suggests that the Australian unemployment rate should be about 0.9 percentage points higher in 1933 than the one in Figure 2 .
2 In the interpolation of unemployment
When making this point, Forster (1988, 296) stated that unemployment as a share of wage and salary workers in 1933 should have been higher by 1.3 percentage points, while the rates here are reported as a share of the labor between the Census benchmarks, the difference between the true rate and the rate in Figure 2 would have then diminished and become zero in 1939. Even after this adjustment, however, the unemployment rates in the U.S. from 1932 through 1939 were substantially higher than in Australia.
Macroeconomic Policy Responses
Both countries began recovering soon after they moved away from strong compliance with the Gold Standard. Australia still was officially on the Gold Standard but a currency devaluation during 1930 was so strong that essentially Australia was among the first to leave the gold standard, albeit unofficially. In contrast, U.S. monetary policy seemed to focus on maintaining the dollar's value under the Gold Standard until finally leaving the Gold Standard soon after Roosevelt left office in 1933. The difference in policies appears to have been a contributing factor to Australia's earlier recovery (Eichengreen 1988, 34; Eichengreen 1992) Neither the Australians nor the Americans ran budget deficits that would have been considered Keynesian in the 1930s. The discussion of the fiscal policy responses to the Great Depression in America have focused on the public statements of Hoover and Roosevelt.
However, the spending, receipt, and deficit numbers reveal a more subtle story. Hoover was a fiscal conservative and called for policies to balance the federal budget, but federal spending rapidly expanded during his administration. The estimates of federal spending in Figure 3 show
force. In 1933 unemployment as a share of the workforce was 18.9, while unemployment as a share of wage and salary workers was 24.4. This suggests that wage and salary workers accounted for 77.5 percent of the labor force; therefore, I multiplied Forster's 1.3 percent figure by .775 to determine how much unemployment as a share of the labor force would have increased when adding relief workers. Since the 1939 figure included relief workers as unemployed, in the interpolation process, the difference in unemployment due to relief workers would have diminished so that it hit zero in 1939. Forster offered an alternative unemployment rate that incorporated estimates of workers who never entered the workforce and the losses of working time from part-time work caused by the Depression as well as the additional relief workers, but there are no comparable estimates for the U.S. Figure 2 show that his administration and the Democratic Congress generally ran deficits in real dollar terms that were only slightly larger than the ones run by Hoover. Starting from a higher base, they raised spending by 68 percent from 1933 to 1936, while tax receipts kept pace, leaving the deficits relatively unchanged.
A crude way to see the lack of a Keynesian response is to show the deficits relative to the decline in Real GDP in both countries. In Australia in 1938-1939 pounds Real GDP in Figure   4b in both 1931 and 1932 was more than $110 million pounds lower than in 1929 but the deficits were no larger than 18 million. In the U.S. in 1939 dollars, the U.S. Real GNP in Figure 4a in
1932 and 1933 fell short of peak real GDP in 1929 by more than $20 billion but the deficits were less than $4 billion.
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The Relief of Unemployment. (Snooks 1988, 313, 316) .
Australian real public unemployment relief distributions as a share of peak real GDP in 1939 contemporary GDP in Table 1 rose from 0.5 percent to 1.9 percent during 1932 when the unemployment rate peaked. Even as the unemployment rate declined, unemployment relief as a
share of peak real GDP rose to 2.39 in 1935 before declining to 1.77 by the end of the decade.
Graham Snooks (1988) (Murphy 2011, pp. 174-5) .
American Relief
In contrast, in the United States after 1932 the federal government became heavily involved in the provision of relief and created a wide range of relief programs. The federal government's first significant move took place in 1932 while Hoover was still president. The
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) authorized $300 million dollars in loans from the federal government to cities to help them in providing relief. The sum amounted to about 0.4 percent of 1929 peak GDP in real terms. States that applied for relief loans had to demonstrate that they had exhausted all means of raising revenue and propose worthy relief projects that would not otherwise be undertaken. The RFC loans were a bold move historically because the U.S. federal system had long treated relief and labor issues as exclusively state and local issues.
Originally, these loans were meant to be repaid at three percent interest through reductions in future highway apportionments, but the RFC was allowed to write them off in 1938. 5 The RFC loans led several states to establish new relief administrations to organize relief at the state level.
During the New Deal the Roosevelt administrations experimented with a wide variety of federal programs that either provided grants to state and local governments or were run by the federal government itself. Arguing that America faced a national peacetime emergency, the national government created the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The FERA distributed federal money to the states, which in turn, distributed the funds to local officials, who administered payments to households "in need." Similar to the Australian practice, the FERA program offered payments for work relief. Unlike the Australian governments, however, the FERA also spent nearly the same amount again for direct relief, or sustenance without a work requirement. The relief payments to each household were determined using a "budgetary deficiency" principle. FERA relief workers and field agents measured the deficit between the family's actual income and a hypothetical minimum budget for a given family size. Actual relief benefits often did not fully cover the family's deficit because relief officials, faced with large case loads and limited funds, reduced benefits per household in order to provide relief for more families. Typically, hourly earnings were roughly half of the level paid for jobs on Public Roads Administration (PRA) and Public Works Administration (PWA) projects.
Expecting a harsh winter in November 1933, the Civil Works Administration (CWA) was created in addition to the FERA to put people to work on public jobs immediately. The CWA employed nearly 4 million people by its second month at hourly earnings that matched PWA and PRA market earning but limited the number of hours per week that could be worked. About half of all CWA recipients had been moved from existing relief programs and most workers were transferred to FERA work relief programs when the CWA closed down in March 1934, most of the workers were transferred back to FERA work relief programs. Between July 1933 and July 1935, the FERA and the CWA annually distributed 3.5 percent of the 1929 peak in real GDP per capita (Fishback and Wallis, forthcoming, Table 2 ).
The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCCR) provided work relief for young men and some young women between the ages of 16 and 24 from families eligible for relief. Most worked on natural resource conservation projects while living in camps run in a semi-military fashion by veterans. The pay was $1 per day, most of which was sent home to the workers' family.
Between 1934 and 1939 the CCCR annually paid out about 0.4 percent of peak 1929 GDP per capita (Fishback and Wallis, forthcoming, Table 2 ).
In 1935 the Roosevelt administration and Congress negotiated a redesigned relief program that included an emergency relief component as well as a permanent national role in the welfare system . The Roosevelt administration gained much tighter control of the operation of emergency work relief by replacing the FERA with the Works Progress Administration (WPA). State and local officials proposed projects and continued to identify who was eligible for relief based on household budget deficits. Then the federal WPA hired people from the certification rolls and paid them hourly earnings for a restricted number of hours per month. As with the FERA, hourly earnings were roughly half those on PWA and PRA projects. To combat fears that private jobs would end quickly, the WPA assured people in many areas that they would be accepted back on work relief if they lost their private job. Even so, a significant percentage of workers stayed on work relief jobs for periods as long as a year and in some cases several years (Margo 1991) . The FERA and WPA were temporary "emergency" programs that would end. Even though some members of the administration wished to make them a permanent feature of the economy, the WPA was phased out by the end of 1942. 6 Between fiscal years 1936 and 1939, the WPA annually spent roughly 2 percent of 1929 per capita GDP (Fishback and Wallis, 2012, forthcoming) .
The permanent components of the 1935 reforms were the most important. Care of the "unemployable" poor was returned to local governments and termed "general relief." The Social Security Act created five major programs. Three were needs-based public assistance programs. 
Howard (1943) describes WPA operation. For a good description of relief activity within a state, see Fearon (2007) for the state of Kansas. A large number of statistical studies analyze the political economy of the distribution of the New Deal relief funds, including most recently Fleck (1999a Fleck ( , 1999b Fleck ( , 2001a Fleck ( , 2008 , Wallis (1987 Wallis ( , 1991 Wallis ( , 1998 Wallis ( , and 2001 and Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) , which summarizes results for a large number of studies of all New Deal programs. See also Wright (1974) . The final component of the Social Security Act was a purely national program, Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). This is the program known commonly as Social Security today. At best it had a slight negative impact in the 1930s because the OASI program collected taxes of one percent on both employers and workers, which began accounting for 5.6 percent of internal federal tax revenue in 1937, but no benefits were paid out to the elderly until 1940 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue 1937, 75) .
Information on the public assistance programs is based on the payouts in the months of January, February of March from Social Security Board. Social Security Bulletin (May 1939): 51. These were compared to an estimate of GDP in 1929 dollars in 1929 of 103.7 billion (series Ca10 from Carter, et. al.) and then adjusted for inflation by the Consumer Price Index (1967=100) (series E-135, p. 210-11, U.S. Census Bureau, 1975) . 
Percentages of GDP per capita are calculated from information in Fishback and Wallis (forthcoming, Table 2 ). For descriptions of the ASCs see Administrator of Veterans' Affairs (1931, pp. 10, 42-44; 1936, pp. 1, 22-24) .
The extent of the federal, state, and local relief programs in the U.S. during the 1930s is summarized in Table 3 Once the New Deal rolled into action, the federal government provided the funds for nearly 79 percent of all relief spending in fiscal years 1934 and 1935 (Table 3) . After the renegotiation of relief responsibilities in the middle of 1935, the federal share began tailing off and fell below 70 percent in 1938 and 1939. As the federal government expanded its activity, private relief expenditures fell to less than a dollar per person. In a more formal analysis with controls for a variety of correlates, John Gruber and Dan Hungerman (2007) found that aid from churches declined significantly in areas where public relief expanded more.
In contrast to the Australian experience, however, the expenditures by the federal government on their long-standing public works activities expanded rather than declined.
Distributions of highway funds to the states, funds for the Army Corps of Engineers for work on rivers and harbors, and loans from the Bureau of Reclamation for irrigation dams and works more than doubled between the 1920s and the Hoover administration and then rose another 60 percent from this higher base under the Roosevelt administration (Fishback and Wallis forthcoming, Table 2 ).
How Successful were the Relief Programs in the U.S.?
Over the past decade I have been working with Shawn Kantor and several other scholars to examine the impact of New Deal policies. I will focus on the findings for relief and public work spending here. The studies are all based on the development of information across time for local areas, which involve states in some studies, cities in some, and counties in others. All the studies seek to identify the impact of the policy on the outcome in multi-variate analyses that control for a variety of other correlates, time-invariant features of the local areas, and nationwide shocks. In quite a few cases instrumental variable (IV) analysis is used to control for endogeneity that tended to bias the coefficients toward finding no effect of the policy. The endogeneity bias often arises because the federal government and the states sought to increase relief spending in response to declines in economic activity or worsening health. They find that work relief poverty programs, like the WPA, served to reduce property crime. A ten percent increase in spending on work relief was associated with a 1.5 percent reduction in property crime. In most specifications the effect of relief payments without a work requirement was smaller in part because people on direct relief were not having their hours soaked up by a work requirement during the day. Relief spending was not as successful as private employment in reducing property crime. The estimates suggest that a one percent decline in employment in a city was associated with a one percent rise in property crime rates in the 1930s.
The federal government's spending on emergency relief programs like the FERA and the WPA during the 1930s led to complaints by some employers that they created disincentives for workers to accept private employment, and thus work relief jobs in particular might crowd out private employment. The debate in the 1930s mirrored the long standing discussions of the issue in both the U.S. and Australia, which suggested that benefits for the unemployed provided an outside option that raised unemployed workers' reservation wage when seeking private employment. What was unusual in the 1930s was that the unemployment rate was so high, over 20 percent in several years, that there seemed to be plenty of unemployed workers to soak up before crowding out could occur.
A series of labor market studies offer conflicting pictures of the impact of relief programs on private employment in the 1930s. Studies of cross-sectional data using IV estimation by Robert Fleck (1999) On the other hand, studies using panel data sets, which allow the research to take advantage of variation both across geographic areas and over time, find some degree of crowding out that varies across time. In the early years of the decade when unemployment was at its peak above 20 percent, Kent Matthews and Daniel Benjamin (1992) find that the addition of one work relief job reduced private employment by about one-third of a job. In that same period Todd Neumann, Price Fishback, and Shawn Kantor (2010) find a slight positive effect of relief spending on private employment. After 1935, when unemployment rates fell below 20 percent, both studies find that an additional work relief job was associated with a reduction of up to nine/tenths of a private job.
The relief jobs may have helped workers in ways that, oddly enough, caused the official measures of unemployment to rise. High unemployment rates often discourage workers from seeking work. These discouraged workers are not considered unemployed under standard definitions of unemployment, which require that someone be actively seeking work to be defined as unemployed. Meanwhile, during the 1930s relief workers were treated as unemployed in the official statistics. As a result, when a relief job in the 1930s became available and was filled by a discouraged worker, the number of unemployed in the official statistics rose by one. Hence we see the odd effect that the creation of an additional relief job could make the official unemployment statistics look worse during the 1930s (Fleck 1999 ).
The impact of public works and relief programs extended well beyond the labor market.
An added dollar of public works and relief spending in a U.S. county was associated with an increase in retail sales of roughly 40 cents (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2005) . Given typical ratios of retail sales to income, this suggests that incomes in the county grew roughly 85 cents at the mean when a dollar was added to public works and relief spending. Counties with greater public works and relief spending appeared to be more attractive to workers, as these counties experienced more in-migration during the 1930s (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor, 2006;  Sorensen, Fishback, and Kantor 2008). would expect to see a high federal spending multiplier for the states, it would be during the period of extraordinary unemployment in the 1930s. The multiplier is small in direct OLS estimation with fixed effects. When IV analysis is used to control for endogeneity, the resulting multiplier implies that an additional dollar of federal relief and public works spending raised personal incomes within the state by somewhere between 90 cents and $1.60. Hypothesis tests cannot reject the hypothesis that the multiplier is around $1 for every $1 in public works and relief spending. The boost to income did not carry over to employment in the private sector, as federal spending had a slight negative impact.
The predominant form of categorical public assistance came in the form of old-age assistance laws, first introduced by the states in the late 1920s and the early 1930s and then expanded by the creation of federal matching grants under the Social Security Act of 1935. The original state old-age assistance laws declared that one goal was to provide enough benefits to the elderly to live on their own. Dora Costa (1999) found that higher benefits under the federal matching grant version of old-age assistance established under the Social Security framework after 1935 allowed more women to live on their own. Leora Friedberg (1999) and Donald Parsons (1991) show that OAA allowed a significant number of elderly to stay out of the labor force.
OAA did not serve to reduced mortality rates of the elderly after controls for other factors are included. Even though raw correlations suggest that the introduction of OAA was associated with lower death rates among the elderly between 1930 and 1938, Stoian and Fishback (2010) find that death rates fell as much or more in the same states for other age groups not eligible for OAA. They suggest that OAA had little effect on death rates in the 1930s because it largely was substituting for benefits through almshouses and other programs that the elderly were receiving under the general poverty programs. Andreea Balan Cohen (2009) finds that OAA is associated with lower death rates in the 1940s and 1950s in part because a broader range of the elderly received benefits. In addition, new technologies like penicillin in the early 1940s meant that relatively small increases in benefits in the 1940s and 1950s could be used to purchase much more effective treatments of some mortal illnesses that had not been treatable in the 1930s.
How Effective was Relief in Australia?
Graham Snooks (1988, 312) argued that the unemployment relief efforts of the states likely had little effect on the recovery because they crowded out spending on other public works.
In essence, the state and local governments elected to try to aid more people with partial pay on work relief, while reducing the number of full-time full-pay public works.
The impact of relief spending potentially might have been different in Australia than in the U.S. based on the role played by the national government. In Australia, the relief spending was being funded by taxes and loans taken out by the state and local governments, so the extra taxes and anticipated repayment of loans may have stifled the salutary impact of relief spending.
This was also true in the U.S. until 1933, when the federal government began distributing large amounts of funds. Thus, in America after 1932, there were opportunities for many cities to gain subsidies from taxpayers in other parts of the country.
The hypothesis of little impact can be tested for death rates, birth rates, and other demographic rates using the same type of local analysis of the impact of relief spending that we performed for the U.S. There is a caveat that the sample size for such a study is much smaller because Australia does not have nearly as many states and cities as there are in the U.S.
However, once state fixed effects are introduced, the variation that is being used to identify the relationships is in the changes within the same state over time in both the U.S. and Australian studies. The number of years covered is almost the same as the number covered in our study of The coefficient ! 1 is an estimate of the relationship between relief spending per capita and the outcome. If the RPS st measure is not correlated with the error $ st , then ! 1 is an unbiased measure of the relationship, and economists tend to ascribe a "causal" relationship to the coefficient. To some extent, the inclusion of the X st correlates, the fixed effects and state time trends control for endogeneity by reducing the number of variables that might be correlated with 
This technique is designed to capture the impact of the portion of the actual policy measure that is correlated with the instrument and thus not correlated with the error term in the final equation.
We used a variety of instruments designed to deal with a different types of endogeneity problems that depended on the outcome. The results can differ when using different instruments, but our results were generally robust to different instrument choices.
In general, improvements in earnings and economic activity had salutary demographic effects. Higher annual manufacturing earnings were associated with lower infant mortality rates and lower death rates. The results for Ordinary Least Squares analysis with state and year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends are listed in Table 4 . They show that a one-standarddeviation (OSD) increase in per capita relief spending was associated with a -0.853 standard deviation reduction in the infant mortality rate. OSD increases in manufacturing earnings were also associated with a reduction in the overall death rate of -0.534 standard deviations and birth rate increases of 0.167 standard deviations.
The benefits of improvements in economic activity also carried over into rural
production. An OSD increase in net revenue from rural production was associated with infant mortality rates that were -0.404 standard deviations lower, death rates that were -0.186 standard deviations lower, and higher marriage rages that were 0.323 standard deviations higher.
The one exception to this story of lower infant mortality associated with improved economic activity is the impact of trade union unemployment. When the employment situation worsened and trade union unemployment rate rose by a standard deviation, the infant mortality rate fell by -0.468 standard deviations.
The OSD effects for these measures of economic activity are generally larger than what we found in the study of 114 American cities (Fishback, Haines, and Kantor, 2007) . The OSD effects for retail sales per capita, which was used as a proxy for economic activity, were around zero for infant mortality, 0.06 for non-infant death rates, and 0.36 for the birth rate. The OSD effects for specific death rates were typically less than 0.2 in absolute value.
The relationships between the demographic outcomes and per capita relief spending are conflicting. The OSD relationship for infant mortality was a positive 0.239, which contrasts with the negative relationship that we found in all of our specifications in the American study. On the other hand higher per capita relief was associated with a lower death rate, although the OSD relationships are not statistically significant in both the Australian state and American city panels. Relief spending in Australia was associated with lower birth rates, in contrast to the effect of higher birth rates in America. Meanwhile, relief spending helped reduced the divorce rate in Australia with a -0.202 OSD effect.
A problem with endogeneity might be biasing the coefficient of relief spending per capita in a positive direction for the infant mortality rate. This would arise if the state governments followed a policy of increasing their relief activity in response to increases in infant mortality even after controlling for trade union unemployment, manufacturing annual earnings, net rural production per rural person and the various fixed effects and time trends. One potential factor might have been aspects of the downturn that hit the poor in ways not captured by the economic measures, which may be missing the problems in the nonunion, nonrural, and nonmanufacturing portions of the economy. Increased problems for the poor would have led to both an increase in infant mortality and likely generated increased relief spending per capita, a combination that leads to a positive bias in the coefficient estimated.
To combat the bias, I have explored the use of an instrumental variable (IV) approach for the equation with state and year fixed effects and state time trends included. I selected a
Hausmann-style instrument that uses relief spending per capita in the rest of the country as an instrument for the changes in relief spending per capita in the state. For example, the instrument for relief spending per capita in New South Wales is created by calculating total relief spending in the rest of the states and dividing by population in the rest of the country to come up with a measure of relief spending per capita outside New South Wales as the instrument. The relationship of spending in a specific state with spending elsewhere might have gone either way.
Increased relief spending elsewhere may have allowed the state to raise relief spending without worries that people would seek to move to that state to gain relief work. On the other hand, the state might have reduced relief spending in hopes that people might move to the other states to gain relief work. The instrument meets one of the criteria of a good instrument if states in the rest of the country are not influenced by unobserved characteristics represented by the error term in that year for the specific state. Given the controls included in the analysis, this assumption does not seem unreasonable.
The second criteria for a good instrument is that it has strength and explanatory power in To reject 10 percent weak-instrument bias, the F-statistic would have to exceed 16.38, so the coefficient on relief spending per capita is subject to some degree of weak instrument bias. The coefficient of the instrument in the first stage was negative suggesting that states reduced their own relief spending in response to increased relief spending elsewhere after controlling for all of the other correlates in the analysis.
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In the IV analysis the OSD effect of relief spending per capita in the IV analysis for the infant mortality rate is -0.210, but not statistically significant. The results suggests that there may have been some positive bias in the positive coefficient seen in the OLS regressions with fixed effects and state time trends. In the IV analysis for death rates, the effect of relief
spending becomes more strongly negative with a statistically significant OSD effect of -0.429.
The relief spending also continues to contribute to decline in birth rates, with an OSD effect of -0.114
Summary
In response to the extraordinary unemployment of the Great Depression in both America and Australi, state and local governments greatly responded their provision of relief to the poor and unemployed. By 1932 Australia had already seen the trough of the Depression and the responsibility for relief remained with state and local governments even as unemployment rates remained well above 10 percent.
In the U.S., howevr, unemployment rates continued to rise through 1933 and the U.S.
federal government began to consider unemployment to be a nationwide problem. The federal government under Franklin Roosevelt and a Democratic Congress therefore provided the lion's share of funding of unemployment relief for most of the rest of the decade.
Both countries provided most of the relief in the form of work relief jobs that paid substantially less than regular government public works jobs and controlled the number of hours worked. Payments per capita and relative to peak 1929 GDP continued to rise after 1933 even though unemployment rates fell somewhat.
How successful were the relief programs? Several recent studies for the U.S. situation suggest that areas with higher relief spending per capita contributed to increases in income and attracted new migrants to those areas. Relief spending helped reduce several types of death rates, reduced crime rates, and helped families return to more normal fertility patterns.
In new research for the Australian states the results suggest that increased income in manufacturing and rural production were associated with lower infant mortality rates and death rates and higher fertility rates. Per capita relief spending was associated with lower death rates in IV analysis, but in contrast to the U.S. experience the per capita relief spending was associated with lower birth rates.
Much of the research on the Great Depression has long focused on the macroeconomic experience. In 1988 Robert Gregory and Noel Butlin edited a volume that examined the macroeconomic recovery from the Depression and taught us a great deal with comparative analyses of the experiences in Australia, Canada, the U.S., Japan, Britain, and New Zealand .
This is a first attempt at comparing the microeconomics of the recovery in the U.S. and
Australia. The results seem fruitful and I believe continued international comparisons will be even more revealing.. Baird (1942) with population information for counties and cities from the U.S. Censuses of 1930 and 1940 available in digital form from Haines (undated) . For the city relief payments the relief per capita measure is the total of all direct relief, work relief and private relief funds. Direct relief with no work requirement includes direct relief under the FERA and from state and local governments, and categorical assistance under the Social Security Act for dependent children, old-age assistance, and aid to the blind. Prior to 1935 the categorical assistance categories refer to funds provided by state and local governments through mothers' pensions, old-age pensions, and state aid to the blind. Work relief includes payments to workers on state and local government, FERA, CWA, and WPA projects. Private relief is the value of relief funds from private and public sources administered by private agencies. The total public relief payments for the U.S. as a whole include all of the above as well as payments through the Civilian Conservation Corps; the National Youth Administration programs; FERA special programs for transients, rural rehabilitation, emergency aid, and student education; Farm Security Administration Grants; unemployment insurance payments, and retirement and unemployment payments under the Railroad Retirement Acts. (1987) . The deflators were adjusted so the 1939 value was equal to 100. The rural population was determined based on Census year estimates from Vamplew (1987, p.26 ) with straight-line interpolations between Census years. When estimating the regressions the variables were created by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviations so the coefficients represent the number of standard deviations that the dependent variable changes with respect to a one-standard deviation increase in the correlate, also known as a one-standard-deviation (OSD) effect. Notes and Sources. See Table 3 . The instrument is real per capita relief spending by the rest of the states. The coefficient on the instrument was negative in the first-stage regression. The Kleibergen-Paap rank k Wald F-statistic for the instrument is 7.15.
